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I. INTRODUCTION
In the post-1945 era, international human rights law has undergone a
dramatic shift, from almost total absorption with the protection of aliens to an
ever-widening concern for the way governments treat their own citizens in
virtually every aspect of human endeavor. Certainly, the major catalyst for this
positive turn of events was the Nazi slaughter of six million Jews.
The ad hoc International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1945-46 was a
milestone event in the development of international law. It infused
international law with fundamental moral principles that contributed to the
modem international law of human rights. The facts of international life,
however, seem to make a mockery of the Nuremberg principles. Events in the
former Yugoslavia stand in striking contrast to the hopes implicit in the
Nuremberg judgments. The commission of crimes in Bosnia defies
well-established rules of international law and completely disregards
elementary dictates of humanity.
This note argues that international law, properly informed by the
Nuremberg principles, deserves consistent application by the ad hoc
International Tribunal (hereinafter Yugoslav Tribunal) in "prosecut[ing]
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
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committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia [since] 1991 . .. ."1 At the
request of the Security Council of the United Nations (hereinafter UN), the UN
Secretary-General submitted a proposal to create the Yugoslav Tribunal to
prosecute responsible persons in the former Yugoslavia. 2 The Security Council
approved that report and, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter, adopted the Statute of the International Tribunal annexed to that

report.3 In so doing, the Security Council consistently imparted the Nuremberg
principles regarding nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law) and

individual responsibility to the Statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal.
In November of 1992, prior to the adoption of the Statute, the American Bar
Association (hereinafter ABA) offered its assistance to the United Nations

regarding the punishment of persons accused of war crimes or crimes against
humanity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 4 As a result, the ABA Section of International
Law created a Task Force to analyze the Statute and report on its
implementation. 5 The Task Force submitted a report to the UN which
supported the creation of the Yugoslav Tribunal, but offered modifications of
the Statute.6 Although the Statute has already been adopted, the Task Force

1

Statute of the International Tribunal, art. 1 [hereinafter Statute]. Acting under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, this Statute was adopted by the
Security Council pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 827. See S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, § 2, Doc. S/25626 (1993). Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter provides
the Security Council with the power to carry out its function of maintaining and
restoring international peace and security. The Security Council, moreover, established
the Yugoslav Tribunal in Resolution 827. See CHARTEROF THE UNITED NATIONS, Chapter
VII.
2

The Report of the Secretary-General was submitted in May of 1993. See Report of
the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808, Doc.
s/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Sec-Gen. Rep.] (unpublished report on file with author). The
Security Council decided in paragraph 1 of resolution 808 (1993) of February 22,1993,
that the Yugoslav Tribunal would be established. Id. at 3. This provision was later
adopted by the Council in resolution 827. Supra note 1. Paragraph 2 of Resolution 808
requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on "all aspects of th[e] [Yugoslav]
matter .... Sec-Gen. Rep., supra at 3. The report's primary purpose was to provide a
detailed plan for the Yugoslav Tribunal's structure and legal procedures. Id. at 6.
3

Supra note 1.

4

At its meeting in November of 1992, the Board of Governors of the American Bar
Association adopted a resolution which offered the ABA's assistance. Pursuant to the
mandate of that resolution, the Section of International Law and Practice established the
Task Force on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia [hereinafter Task Force]. See
SPECIAL TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTIONOF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, REPORT
ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALTO ADJUDICATE WAR CRIMES COMMITEDINTHE FORMER

YUGOSLAVIA 1 (1993) [hereinafter ABA REP.].
SId.
6

1d. at 2.
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believes that the UN may still consider its recommendations before
7
implementing the Statute.

This note argues that such modifications need not be considered any further
for the following two reasons. First, as the result of universal acceptance of the

Nuremberg judgment as customary international law,8 some of the proposed

changes are superfluous. Second, other modifications detour significantly from
the path of consistency. Thus, the modifications as set forth by the Task Force
should continue to be disregarded by the Security Council.
Part II of the note briefly explores the history of the Nuremberg proceedings
and the law of war. This background is necessary to fully appreciate the
principles embraced at Nuremberg. Part III examines several of the principles
set forth at Nuremberg and addresses how these principles have been
integrated into modem international law. The primary focus is on the principle
of nullum crimen sine lege, relating to the defense of ex post facto law, and the
principle of individual responsibility as regards the defense of superior orders.
Parts IV and V, respectively, examine the major events leading to the
establishment of the Yugoslav Tribunal and adoption of the Nuremberg
principles by the Tribunal.

II. THE NUREMBERG CONTRIBUTION
The International Military Tribunal (hereinafter IMT) and the war crimes
trials held in Nuremberg from 1945-46 are continuously looked to as a source
and test of the international law of war.9 Although other military tribunals have
existed since World War II, none possess the precedential value that has been
attributed to Nuremberg.' 0 The trial of the major war criminals at Nuremberg
7

1d. Although the Task Force would like the UN to further consider its
recommendations, the Security Council is under no obligation to do so.
8
See Sec-Gen. Rep., supra note 2, at 10, § 35.
9
TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 4 (1992). An assistant
prosecutor in the first trial of Nazi leaders at Nuremberg, Germany, in 1945, Mr. Taylor
became the chief prosecutor in the subsequent war crimes trials. See 1-15 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
No. 10 (Oct. 1946-Apr. 1949) [hereinafter CONTROL COUNCIL]. These legal prosecutions
were waged by the military tribunals of the occupational authorities in their respective
zones. American military tribunals operated in Nuremberg pursuant to Allied Control
Council Law No. 10 (signed December 20,1946, by the Control Council). TAYLOR, supra,
at 275. According to Mr. Taylor, "Control Council Law No. 10, together with the
amended Executive Order, laid the legal and administrative basis for the war crimes
cases at Nuremberg which were to follow the pending trial before the International
Military Tribunal." Id. at 276. Control Council Law No. 10 established uniform legal
bases of punishment. Id. at 275. The principles discussed in Section III are those of the
International Military Tribunal, as well as the subsequent American trials. Thus, the
principles discussed will encompass the Nuremberg Charter, the agreement of the major
powers that defined the jurisdiction and functions of the ad hoc Nuremberg Tribunal,
and Control Council Law No. 10.
10
ABA REP., supra note 4, at 5. Paralleling the Nuremberg proceedings was an
extensive trial in Tokyo of both civil and military Japanese leaders accused of
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was the first major attempt to punish the perpetrators of crimes cruel and
inhuman to a degree not previously known to humanity.1'
Millions of innocent civilians, including Jews, Gypsies, and homosexuals,
were systematically murdered by the Nazis.1 2 Prisoners of war and civilian
populations were tortured and murdered at will.13 Some innocent civilians
were subjected to the Nazis' infamous medical experiments conducted
specifically to evoke the utmost pain and suffering.14 Entire populations were
deported to provide slave labor under the most horrible conditions in German
factories. 15 Moreover, random villages were destroyed and their inhabitants
disposed of as suited the German purposes. 16 The list of war crimes and crimes
against humanity is virtually endless. 17 Undoubtedly, the majority of these
crimes arose from the Nazi conception of "total war," where everything, from
rules and regulations to assurances and treaties, became subordinate to the
18
overpowering dictates of war.

A. The Law of War
Throughout history, war has consistently been restricted by humanity. These
limits are designed to protect certain classes of enemy persons during war.
Evidence of such limits can be traced back to the 1907 Hague Conventions 19

responsibility for waging a war of aggression. The Tokyo trials lasted two and a half
years but have not become as significant a precedent as Nuremberg. Id. at 4.
11
See generally 24-42 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL (1947) [hereinafter IMT] (documents in evidence at Nuremberg).
12 ROBERT E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG 37-38 (1983) (describing the abundance
of Cerman documents available to the International Military Tribunal).
13

1d. at 227; see also 1 IMT, supra note 11, at 227.

14

CONOT, supra note 12, at 286-96.

151 IMT, supra note 11; TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 427-31 (describing forced labor

program).
16

CONOT, supra note 12, at 227; see also 1 IMT, supranote 11, at 228.

17

The Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which defined the constitution,
jurisdiction, and functions of the IMT, lists three types of crimes for which the Nazis
were indicted: (a) crimes against peace, (b) war crimes, and (c) crimes against humanity.
CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, reprintedin 1 IMT 173, supra note
11, art. 6, at 173-74 [hereinafter NUREMBERG CHARTER]. Any references in Sections IV and
V of this note to Article 6 of the Charter will only pertain to (b) and (c), for the crimes
within the Bosnia Tribunal's jurisdiction do not involve crimes against peace.
181 IMT, supranote 11, at 226-27.
19See Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
with Annex of Regulations [hereinafter Hague Regulations], 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539;
JAMEs BRoWN SCOTT, THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907
(2d ed. 1915).
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and the Geneva Convention of 1929,20 where the modem law of war has its
roots.
The progressive development of norms of humanitarian law culminated
after World War II in the adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.21 Each
of the four conventions of 1949 further endorsed the 1929 Geneva Convention
by qualifying violations of humanitarian law.2 2 The 1977 adoption of the
supplementary protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 affirmed and
expanded upon the norms of humanitarian law. 23
The Hague and Geneva Conventions contributed to the development of
modem international law. The law of war, however, is to be found not only in
conventions and treaties, but in the customs and practices of states and the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. 24
The IMT reminded the world that international law is not the product of an
international legislature, and that international agreements have to deal with
general principles of law, and not with administrative matters of procedure. 25
The law of war is not static, but by continual adaptation follows the needs of a
changing world.26 Indeed, in many cases, treaties do no more than express and
define for more accurate reference the principles of law already existing. 27 The
Nuremberg principles, therefore, have become a part of international
customary law.
The IMT and the national tribunals that acted in accordance with its
principles defended profoundly humane values-life, liberty, human dignity,

20
Convention of Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, July 27, 1929; see G.I.A.D.
Draper, The Development of International Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL

DIMENsIoNs OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 67 (1988) (discussing the role of the 1929 Geneva

Convention).
21
Geneva Conventions of 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31-32, 85-96, 135-36, 287-88.
22
See id.
23
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (entered into
force, Dec. 7, 1978), reprintedin 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977), and Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (entered into force, Dec. 7, 1978), reprinted in 16
I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
24
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, June
26,1945 (entered into force Oct. 24,1945), art. 38, § 1, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993,3 Bevans
1153,1976 Y.B.U.N. 1052 [hereinafter Statute of ICJ]; 1 IMT, supra note 11, at 221; seealso
GEORGE GINSBURGS & V.N. KUDRIAVTSEV, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 172 (1990) ("TheHague and Geneva rules have becomepartof general international
law and bind all states irrespective of whether they ratified this or that convention.").
251 IMT, supra note 11, at 221.
26[d.
27Id.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1994

5

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:705

culture, peace and human rights. 28 The Nuremberg principles are proof for the

peoples of the world that these principles can be used to prosecute violations
29
of international humanitarian law no matter where they occur in the world.
According to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali:
The part of conventional international humanitarian law which has
beyond doubt become part of international customary law is the law
applicable in armed conflict as embodied in: the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims; the Hague
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
and the Regulations annexed thereto of 18 October 1907; the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide of 9 December 1948; and the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945.30
Nuremberg, therefore, is an established31 legal precedent, and its principles are
a vital part of international law today.
Conventional international law evidences the United Nations' dedication to
continue to promulgate human rights resolutions that further elaborate the
Nuremberg principles.3 2 As Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali demonstrated,
these resolutions have succeeded in promoting and establishing respect for
human rights as a part of customary international law.33
28

GINSBURGS & KUDRIAVTSEV, supra note 24, at 282-83; see CONTROL COUNCIL, supra
note 9.
29
1n a unanimous resolution adopted in 1946, the UN General Assembly affirmed
the principles of international law recognized by the Nuremberg Charter. See U.N.G.A.
Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/236, at 1144 (1946).
30Sec-Gen. Rep., supra note 2, at 9.
31

1d.

32

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948 (entered into force, Jan. 12, 1951), 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide
Convention]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10,1948, U.N.G.A. Res. 217
A (Il), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 19,1966, U.N.G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16,
at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprintedin 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967); International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, U.N.G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprintedin 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); Declaration
on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion
or Belief, Nov. 25,1981, U.N.G.A. Res. 36/55,36 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 171, U.N.
Doc. A/36/684 (1981), reprintedin 21 T.L.M. 205 (1982); Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984 (entered
into force June 26,1987), U.N.G.A. Res. 39/46 Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at
197, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72, Annex (1984), reprintedin 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984).
33

Sec-Gen. Rep., supra note 2, at 9; see also BURNS H. WESTON Er AL, INTERNATIONAL
LAw AND WORLD ORDER 733 (2d ed. 1990) ("Moreover, any doubts we may feel as to the
effectiveness of conventions as an instrument of change should not blind us to their
important role as an obstacle to retrogression. Conditions change and seemingly
unimportant ramifications today may become significant tomorrow ... '.
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B. Significant Provisionsof the Nuremberg Charter
The Nuremberg Charter and judgment left an indelible mark on the law of
war, particularly because it encompassed the notion of individual
responsibility for violations of international law.34 The following acts were
considered crimes for which the International Military Tribunal found
individual responsibility:
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation,
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the
foregoing;
(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war.
Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder,
ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of
civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment
of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder
of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war; or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or
in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not
in violation of the domestic law of the country where
35
perpetrated.
Provisions (b) and (c) of Article 6 involve norms regarding military operations
and the protection of human rights in military conflicts, respectively. These are
the norms that constitute international humanitarian law and strive to suppress
and prevent war crimes.
The Nuremberg Charter also provided that "[tihe official position of
defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government
departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility."36
Further, "[tihe fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of [the]
34For example, Article 6 held leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices all

responsible for the execution of plans by any individuals. NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra
note 17, art. 6 (enumerating crimes for individual responsibility); see Gary Komarow,

Individual Responsibility Under InternationalLaw: The Nuremberg Principles in Domestic

Legal Systems, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 21,22-24 (1980) ("From time immemorial, customary

international law has established individual responsibility for violation of some of its
general norms.").
35
NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 17, art. 6, T. 17 (a), (b), (c); see 1 CONTROL COUNCIL,
supra note pmbl., art. 2 (listing corresponding definitions of these crimes).
36

NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 17, art. 7.
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Government or of a superior shall not free [the individual] from responsibility,
but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines
that justice so requires."3 7 These provisions relate to the defense of superior
orders, an individual's attempt to shift the responsibility for the crime
committed. The following section expounds on this defense.
III. MAJOR PRINCIPLES THAT EMERGED FROM NUREMBERG AND How THEY
HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO INTERNATIONAL LAW

The crimes set forth in Article 6 of the Charter are the crimes that seem
impossible to prevent, to avoid, or to forget. And they have a way of focusing
the mind. The defendants at the Trial of the Major War Criminals at Nuremberg,
however, focused on the protection that they believed the law afforded them,
by asserting the defenses of ex post facto application of law and the related
principle of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law) and the defense of
38
superior orders and the related principle of individual responsibility.
A. The Status of Aggressive War
A great controversy existed relating to the legal criminal status of waging
challenged the Tribunal's authority to make
aggressive war.3 9 The defendants
40
aggressive war a crime.
It was urged [at Nuremberg] on behalf of the defendants that a
fundamental principle of all law-international and domestic-is that
there can be no punishment of crime without a pre-existing law.
"Nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege." It was submitted that
ex post facto punishment is abhorrent to the law of all civilized nations,
that no sovereign power had made aggressive war a crime at the time
that the alleged criminal acts were committed, that no statute had
defined aggressive war, that no penalty had been fixed for its
37

Id. art. 8.

IMT, supra note 11, at 219. An "ex post facto" law is a law passed after the
occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively changes the legal
381

consequences or relations of such fact or deed. Further, it is every law which, in relation
to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 580 (6th ed. 1990). Historically, ex post facto law also refers to
the situation of an act being generally regarded as criminal and otherwise wrong at the
time of commission but lacking authoritatively an expressly prescribed punishment at
that time. WESTON, supra note 33, at 55. Ex post facto is based on the maxim nulla poena
sine lege, no punishment without law. JOHN A. APPLEMAN, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 47 (1971).
391 IMT, supra note 11, at 219-23; see United States v. Von Leeb ("The High Command
Case"), 10 CONTROL COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 364-66 (closing statement for defendant
Von Leeb); TAYLOR, supranote 9, at 581.
40

The Tribunal held that the Charter made aggressive war a crime, and that it was
"therefore not strictly necessary to consider whether and to what extent aggressive war
IMT, supra note 11, at 219.
1I.."
[had previously been] a crime .
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commission,
and no court had been created to try and punish
41
offenders.
The indictment charged the defendants with crimes against peace 'bythe
planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of aggression, which
were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and
assurances."42 As a result, the defendants applied the ex post facto defense to
those charges. 43
The Tribunal used the 1928 Pact of Paris to convict the Nazi defendants on
violations of crimes against peace. 44 It was the Tribunal's belief that nations
who signed the treaty or adhered to it unconditionally condemned recourse to
45 The
war for the future as an instrument of policy and expressly renounced it.
signatories declared in Article 1 of the Pact of Paris that "they condemn recourse
to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an
instrument of national policy in their relations to one another."46 The Tribunal
further held that renunciation involved the notion that such a war is illegal in
47
international law.
The defendants argued that the Pact did not expressly claim that aggressive
wars are crimes or set up courts to try those who make such wars.48 The
defendants made the same argument relating to the rules of the Hague
Convention. They claimed that the rules of the Hague Convention were
obsolete and obedience to orders and military necessity justified everything
they had done. 49 The Tribunal agreed that, like the Pact of Paris, the Hague
Convention did not expressly enact that certain methods of waging war are
criminal. 50 The Tribunal considered it sufficient, however, that these
prohibitions had been enforced long before 1907 and that individuals guilty of

41
42

Id.
d. at 171. This charge is further documented in Article 6 (a) of the Charter. See supra

note 17.
43

TAYLOR, supranote 9, at 581-82; see also 3 IMT, supra note 11, at 91, 93-601.

441 IMT,supra note 11, at 219-20. The Pact (also known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact)
was binding on Germany at the outbreak of war in 1939. Id. at 219; see also TAYLOR, supra
note 9, at 20 (discussing Pact's existence before the Charter as a treaty of nonaggression
so that no element of ex post facto existed regarding crimes against peace).
451 IMT, supranote 11, at 220; see also TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 20.
461 IMT, supranote 11, at 220.
47

1d. The Tribunal's opinion on the illegality of aggressive war international law
defeated the defendants' challenge relating to the legal effect of the Pact. Id.
48
49

Id.
TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 487.

501 IMT, supranote 11, at 220.
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violating such prohibitions had previously been tried and punished by military

tribunals.5 1
The problems that certain Nazis had with the vagueness of the Charter's
laws defining crimes were insignificant in the light of their knowledge of the
illegality of aggressive war.52 In the words of Judge Walter Beals:

To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and
assurances have attacked neighboring states without warning is
obviously untrue, for in such circumstances, the attacker must know

that he is doing wrong; and so far from it being unjust to punish53him,
it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished.
Judge Beals also believed that the defendants occupied positions in the Nazi
hierarchy where they would have known of treaties and that therefore, the
defendants must have known that deliberate acts of aggression and invasion
were clearly in violation of international law.54 Those who know they are
wrong when they act should be prepared to accept a fair punishment.
In complete defiance of the Nuremberg judgment and the principles set forth

therein, the view has been advanced that under nullum crimen sine lege,
punishment on the grounds of the customary law or on the grounds of the

general principles of justice or by analogy is forbidden. 55 Further, only a clear
formulation of the criminal laws is to be observed, as a judge interpreting a
vague law may easily create a new offense under the pretext of applying the
56

law.

The Nuremberg Charter and judgment are the documents that most
articulately demonstrate that the world does not subscribe to a legalistic notion

SlId. at 221. It was the Tribunal's opinion that "those who wage aggressive war are
doing that which is equally illegal, and of much greater moment than a breach of one
of the rules of the Hague Convention." Id.
52
d. at 220.
53

PAUL BURMAN, THE FIRST GERMAN WAR CRIMES TRIAL: CHIEF JUDGE WALTER B.
BEALS' DESK NOTEBOOK OF THE DocToRs' TRIAL, HELD IN NUREMBERG, GERMANY,

DECEMBER, 1945 TOAUGUST, 1947 72 (1985). Judge Walter Beals served as Presiding Judge
over the Doctors' Trial, one of the subsequent Nuremberg proceedings that occurred
under Control Council Law No. 10. During the nine months of that trial, some of the
most brilliant and influential German doctors and medical administrators were brought
to account for the murder and mutilation of thousands of human test subjects. Id.
54

d. The Tribunal declared that "the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation
of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice." 1 IMT, supra note 11, at 219. In
line with Judge Beals' beliefs, the Tribunal was inclined to rule out any ex post facto
defense against crimes against peace on the basis of this interpretation alone. Id.
55

STANISLAW POMORSKI, AMERICAN COMMON LAW AND THE PRINCIPLE NULLUM
CRIMEN SINE LEGE 25 (1975).
56

d. Interpretation of indecisive language is believed to promote arbitrary judicial
power. Id.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss4/12
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of the law of war, but rather to a more general notion of moral tolerance. 5 7 A
legalistic view of the law of war may be more appropriate for common law.
The function of international law, however, is to establish broad general
principles of law and justice recognized by nations.
The role of custom in international law should be emphasized to
demonstrate the greater freedom associated with ex post facto application of
international law.58 For example, the prologue to the Hague Convention
specifies that:
[Iln cases not included in the Regulations adopted by [the contracting
parties], the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the
protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they
result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience. 9
Thus, written rules on aggressive war were not necessary in order to convict
and punish individuals for the commission of aggressive war. 60 And
subsequently, no ex post facto application of law occurred when the defendants
were convicted and punished by the Tribunal for the commission of crimes
against peace.
B. War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
The International Military Tribunal was bound by the Charter's definitions
of war crimes and crimes against humanity.61 The crimes defined in Article 6
(b), however, were already recognized as war crimes under international law.62
Further, the documentary and oral evidence that the prosecution presented left
no doubt that international law had been violated to a degree never before
known.63 The ex post facto argument, therefore, was not applied to Count
Three (war crimes).64

57

E. Thomas Moroney, Jr., Military Dissent and the Law of War: Uneasy Bedfellows, 58

S. CAL. L. REV. 871, 877 (1985).
58

APPLEMAN, supra note 38, at 48 ('For in international law there is no restriction as
to ex post facto law-the question can be only the enforcement of law which is found in
the common conscience ....).
59Hague Regulations, supra note 19, at 2280.
60TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 485.

611 IMT, supra note 11, at 253.
62

Id. War crimes, as defined by the Charter, "were covered by Articles 46,50,52, and
56 of the Hague Convention of 1907, and Articles 2, 3, 4, 46, and 51 of the Geneva
Convention of 1929." Id.; see also supra notes 49-51.
631 IMT, supranote 11, at 226-27.
64
The Tribunal found: "[tihat violation of [the] provisions [in the Hague and Geneva
Conventions regarding war crimes] constituted crimes for which the guilty individuals
were punishable is too well settled to admit of argument." Id. at 253.
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The defendants argued, instead, that the Hague Convention did not apply
at all. 65 They pointed to Article 2 of the Convention which provides: "The
provisions contained in the Regulations [Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land] referred to in Article 1, as well as in the present Convention, do
not apply except between Contracting Powers, and then only if all the
belligerents are parties to the Convention. 66 In the eyes of the Tribunal, this
argument was a red herring.67 What mattered was that the rules of the
Convention had been "recognized by all civilized nations and were regarded
[, moreover,] as declaratory of the laws and customs of war... referred to in
Article 6 (b) of the Charter."68
The war crimes committed by the Nazis were so atrocious that no legal
precedent would have been necessary in order to punish the defendants.
Villages were burned and their inhabitants buried dead or alive. 69 German
hospitals were established, not to heal, but to kill the patients. 70 Human beings
served as guinea pigs in the infamous Nazi medical experiments. 7 1 Others were
deported to partake in the Nazis' forced labor program for as long as they could
72 Gas chambers
withstand it.
and crematoriums awaited at the concentration
73
camps. The world's conscience convicted the defendants. Any ex post facto
claim would have been laughable.
With regard to Count Four (crimes against humanity), the overwhelming
and damning evidence of the Nazis' vast scale of racial and religious
persecution again eliminated concern about ex post facto claims. 74 On the road
to colonization, the Nazis searched only for people of "purely Germanic
blood."75 The "final solution" consisted of the planned and systematic
65

1d.

66

Hague Regulations, supra note 19, art. 2.

67

The Tribunal felt that it was not necessary to decide the question of the status of
several belligerents with regard to the 1907 Hague Convention. 1 IMT, supranote 11, at
253-54.
68
69

70
71

d. at 254.
TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 314.

d. at 312.
d. at 301.

72
See 1 IMT, supra note 11, at 243-47. Certain crimes overlap and are, therefore,
counted as war crimes and crimes against humanity. Deportation is such a crime. See
NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 17, at art. 6, §§ (b), (c).

731 IMT, supra note 11, at 251-52.
74
d. at 254. The closest argument that remotely resembled an ex post facto claim
involved Dr. Robert Servatius' defense of Fritz Sauckel. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 485
(relating Servatius' claim that the Charter did not clearly define certain crimes); cf.
TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 428-29 ("But deportation ..,was a crime under the provisions
of the Hague Conventions.").
751 IMT, supra note 11, at 237.
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annihilation of the Jews. 76 Human ashes were used for fertilizer, and fat from
the victims' bodies proved resourceful in the manufacture of soap. 77
It is not possible to recount fully the instances of horror in this note. The
systematic implementation of the crimes is just as shocking as the crimes
themselves. Although the ex post facto question is rendered much easier by a
finding of treaty violation, the Tribunal's resort to customs and international
principles was sufficient in this case.78 Clearly, the trial was a trial of first
impression.
C. SuperiorOrders

The defendants at the Trial of the Major War Criminals also submitted on
their behalf the defense of superior orders. 79 This defense involves the question
of whether or not a person in the military acting under the orders of a superior
may be exonerated from any wrongdoing committed pursuant to such orders.
The defendants at Nuremberg made the defense based on the principle of
absolute loyalty to the Fuhrer's will.80 The Tribunal rejected their plea.81 Article
8 of the Nuremberg Charter specifically provided: "The fact that the Defendant
acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him
from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the
Tribunal determines that justice so requires." 82 The Tribunal, therefore, adhered
to the Charter and held that superior orders could be considered only in
mitigation of the offense. 83
"Mitigation of punishment does not in any sense.., reduce the degree of the
crime" or undo any damage already done.84 As completely illegal orders, they
should not have been obeyed in the first place. Any soldier who commits a war
crime is guilty of committing a war crime and subsequently, deserves to be
punished. 85 "The conventional view of superior orders as a plea in mitigation
76

Id. at 250.

77

1d. at 252.
See Statute of ICJ, supra note 24.

78

791 IMT, supra note 11, at 223-24.
80

Id. at 223.

81

id. at 224.

82

NUREMBERG CHARTER, supranote 17, art. 8; see CONTROL COUNCIL, supra note 9, art.
2, § 4 (a)-(b) (enumerating corresponding rules on superior orders). It is also significant
to note that "there was no dissent as to the rejection of superior orders as a defense." See
LESUE C. GREEN, SUPERIOR ORDERSIN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 279-80 (1976).

831 IMT, supra note 11, at 224.
84

See APPLEMAN, supra note 38, at 191.
It is of interest that an article by Dr. Joseph Goebbels, the Reich Minister of Public
Enlightenment and Propaganda, which appeared in the VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER, the
official Nazi publication, on May 28,1944, contained the following statement of law:
85
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86
of punishment [does not hold an individual] 100% liable for the war crime."
The fact that a person was ordered to commit a crime may be allowed in
7
mitigation of his responsibility, though not in exoneration of it.8 Those accused
of crimes have potentially much to gain from the superior orders defense since
it may help reduce the severity of their punishment.
Although the Tribunal rejected the defense of superior orders at Nuremberg,
there are certain moral and legal issues to consider when deciding to eliminate
superior orders as a defense. Whether superior orders is an excuse or a
justification for illegal action centers first and foremost on the issue of
obedience versus moral choice.88 For example, if an order is illegal and obeyed,
a judge may question whether the soldier acted in obedience to his superiors
or on his own discretion. The Tribunal's task involved the89 determination of
whether a soldier is ever obligated to follow illegal orders.
The evidence presented at the Nuremberg trials provided history with the
prototype of "crimes of obedience."90 Certain Nazi defendants such as Alfred
Jodl believed that "obedience is really the ethical basis of the military pro-

It is not provided in any military law that a soldier in the case of a
despicable crime is exempt from punishment because he passes the
responsibility to his superior, especially if the orders of the latter are
in evident contradiction to all human morality and every international

usage of warfare.
CONOT, supra note 12, at 513; see also 11 CONTROL COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 509.
86
See Anthony D'Amato, Superior Orders vs. Command Responsibility, 80 A.J.I.L. 604
(1986) (explaining that the defense of superior orders does not go to the determination
of guilt).
87
1d. Although the Nuremberg Charter provides for superior orders as a plea in
mitigation, supra note 82, the responsibility of individual defendants is acknowledged
as follows:
Superior orders, even to a soldier, cannot be considered in mitigation
where crimes have been committed consciously, ruthlessly and without
military excuse or justification .... Participation in such crimes as these
has never been required of any soldier and [they] cannot now shield
[themselves] behind a mythical requirement of soldierly obedience at all
costs as [their] excuse for commission of these crimes.
GREEN, supranote 82, at 279 (quoting from the Nuremberg judgment).
88

The Tribunal believed that "the true test ... is not the existence of the order, but
whether moral choice was in fact possible." See 1 IMT, supra note 11, at 224; see also
HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE ii (1989) (describing the

source of superior orders as unquestioning obedience versus principled resistance).
89
See KELMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 88, at 48 ("Soldiers are not obligated to follow
orders that are unlawful; in fact, they are obligated to disobey them.").
90
Id. at 31-32. A "crime of obedience" is loosely defined here as an act performed in
response to orders from superiors that is considered illegal or immoral by the larger
community. Further, an act of obedience becomes a crime of obedience with evidence
that the actor either knew or should have known that the order was illegal. Id. at 46-47.
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fession." 91 For Jodi, it was not a matter of obedience versus moral choice.
Instead, obedience was to be equated with moral choice, and superior orders

excused his criminal actions. 92
Jodl's beliefs tend to portray the soldier as an automaton trained to respond
not as a person but as a machine. Soldiers are taught to follow orders, and
military effectiveness depends on the obedience of others. Special attention is
also given to the obedience of orders on the battlefield. 93 The illegality of an
order is not important; obeying an order is what counts.
Strangely enough, the German soldier in World War I and even under the
Nazi regime was told in his book of military law that he was not to carry out
orders he knew were illegal. 94 Adopted in 1872, Article 47 of the German

Military Penal Code provided the following:
If the execution of a military order in the course of duty violates the
criminal law, then the superior officer giving the order will bear the
sole responsibility therefor. However, the obeying subordinate will
share the punishment of the participant: (1) if he has exceeded the
order given to him, or (2) if it was within his knowledge that the order
of his superior officer concerned an act by which it was intended to
95
commit a civil or military crime or transgression.

Pursuant to the German military code, therefore, the subordinate incurred a
share of responsibility for an order if he understood its criminal character. 96

91

See TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 437. Jodl was the equivalent of an American four-star
general and the highest German rank before Field Marshal. See also David Daube, The
Defence of Superior Orders in Roman Law, Inaugural Lecture Before the University of
Oxford (Feb. 8, 1956), at 13 (discussing "the defence of superior orders [as] raised by a
soldier, from whom discipline is expected.").
92
TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 437; see also id. at 248 (discussing the defense of superior
orders to the absolute).
93
See Moroney, supra note 57, at 880; see also 11 CONTROL COUNCIL, supra note 9, at
511 ("They were soldiers-not lawyers.").
942 IMT, supra note 11, at 150; see also 11 CONTROL COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 509.
952 IMT, supra note 11, at 150. Robert Jackson, the American Chief Prosecutor at the
Nuremberg trial, referred to this provision of the German military code. See APPLEMAN,
supra note 38, at 51.
96
1n addition to the provision inthe German military code regarding superior orders,
Goebbels provided additional evidence of the Nazis' knowledge that the superior orders
defense would not exculpate a person from his crimes. Goebbels stated in a German
newspaper on May 28, 1944:
No international law of warfare is in existence which provides that a
soldier who has committed a mean crime can escape punishment by
pleading as his defense that he followed the commands of his superiors.
This holds particularly true if those commands are contrary to all
human ethics and opposed to the well established international usage
of warfare.
See APPLEMAN, supra note 38, at 312 (quoting Goebbels).
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"There is a growing tendency to reject the view that the soldier is an
automaton." 97 As a human being capable of making moral choices, the soldier
always has options. Moral choices may be more difficult to make on the
battlefield, but, nevertheless, soldiers do have the ability to make choices. Thus,
the varying degrees of difficulty do not justify a defendant's claim that he had
98
no choice, that he was just following orders.
Another related issue involves whether the soldier had reasonable means for
knowing an order was illegal. This question typically involves consideration
of knowledge possessed, the discretion to act or to decline to act, and the
motives of the individual. 9 9 The degree of perceived illegality of an order plays
a significant role in determining the appropriate punishment for the
accused. 10 0 Telford Taylor advocates an extremely lenient view where "[i]f the
defendant did not know, and had no basis for knowing, that the order he had
obeyed was unlawful, the defendant should not be held liable at all." 101 Taylor
believes superior orders should not be limited to consideration only in
mitigation. 102 Instead, Taylor embraces superior orders as a limited defense,
but a defense nonetheless.
On the other hand, those who know they are wrong when they act should
be prepared to accept a fair punishment. Certainly, the position of the recipient
of the order in the military hierarchy influences adjudication of a superior
orders plea in mitigation of punishment. As the Trial of the Major War
Criminals demonstrated, the higher the soldier's rank, the less weight will be
given to such a plea. 103 Those higher in the chain of command are presumably
more likely to be in a position to take initiatives and to derive personal benefits

97

See GREEN, supra note 82, at 247 (discussing the expansion of compulsory education
and the resulting expectation that the ordinary soldier exercise some measure of
judgment).
98

See Moroney, supra note 57, at 890.

99

APPLEMAN, supra note 38, at 55; see also 11 CONTROL COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 510
("For a defendant to be held criminally responsible, there must be a breach of some moral
obligation fixed by international law, a personal act voluntarily done with knowledge
of its inherent criminality under international law.").
100

See 11 CONTROL COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 512 ("In any event in determining the
criminal responsibility of the defendants.. ., it becomes necessary to determine not only
the criminality of an order in itself but also as to whether or not such an order was
criminal on its face.").
101

See TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 630.

102 Id.
103 For example, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, who maintained the highest rank in
the army, was responsible for carrying out Hitler's orders; his signature was on the
orders. Thus, the Tribunal believed it was an injustice to let him get away with the
defense and declared that Keitel was to have "nothing in mitigation." Id. at 589 (quoting
Keitel). It is noteworthy that the crimes committed by the Nazis were not the result of
excesses on the part of individual soldiers, but the consequence of the execution of orders
and plans of the high command.
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from their actions. They are also presumed to be better able to discriminate
between legal and illegal orders and to challenge orders that they find
questionable.1 0 4
Both the individual's position in the military and the type of war crime
committed factor into consideration of a superior orders plea in mitigation of
punishment. For example, the clearer or more heinous the war crime, the less
weight generally will be given to the plea that the perpetrator was only
following orders.10 5 Certainly, a gas chamber operator would have a more
difficult time making a successful plea in mitigation than an ordinary soldier
or a staff officer.106
It is generally accepted that those who know that the order called for illegal
acts should be found guilty. In this scenario, however, coercion or duress is
advocated as a factor to be relied on only as a matter of mitigation. 10 7 It is
possible to see mixed motives in obedient actions, and it is very likely that an
obedient subordinate may respond out of fear, in addition to or even instead
of, obligation.108 For example, a soldier low in the military chain, not as aware
of military plans, and not as educated as higher ranked officials may believe
that resistance will result in his death or in harm to his family. Regarding
coercion, Nuremberg left us with the following standard:
To establish the defense of coercion or necessity in the face of danger
there must be a showing of circumstances such that a reasonable man
would apprehend that he was in such imminent physical peril as to
deprive10him
of freedom to choose the right and refrain from the
9
wrong.

104
KELMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 88, at 50n; see also CONOT, supra note 12, at 494
(explaining the mockery made by many of the Nazi defendants of the soldiers' oath of
obedience to military orders).

105 Daube, supra note 91, at 6 ("[I]t
is here, where the gravity of the offense must be
obvious to any decent person, that the recipient of the order ought to make a stand.").
106
See 11 CONTROL COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 513 (describing the commission of a
criminal act under international law by a staff officer who takes personal action to see
that a criminal order is properly distributed to make it effective); see also Daube, supra
note 91, at 12 ("Clearly, from the responsibility for some offenses no duty to a superior
and no duress can exonerate you.").
107

TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 630.

108
KELMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 88, at 49n. Regarding the element of fear, it is
interesting that Hitler never pushed one of his subordinates beyond his principles if it
became clear that an act went against the man's conscience. For example, no
concentration camp guard was punished for his refusal to commit murder. CONOT, supra
note 12, at 513-14; see also APPLEMAN, supra note 38, at 56 (describing Nazis who safely
retired from the regime or contemplated resignation without any fear).

10911 CONTROL COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 509. Certain Nazi defendants argued that
obedience to orders and military necessity justified everything they had done. See
TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 487; cf. APPLEMAN, supra note 38, at 313 (describing military
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Thus, if coercion was a factor, it would need to be immediate rather than
remote.
The increasing expectation of courts that an ordinary soldier exercise some
measure of judgment and conscience comes with the growing tendency to
reject the view that the soldier is an automaton. 110 The expansion of
compulsory education and the use of a general draft account for this sentiment.
Courts presume that a soldier has the mental ability to recognize and more
importantly, to refuse to obey, a manifestly unlawful order.111 The morals and
values of an individual are related to these presumptions. Value-oriented
individuals are more likely to focus on the consequences of their actions and
subsequently, are more inclined to challenge authority.112 The value of a human
being's life is the most fundamental value a soldier would be expected to have
and to appreciate.
Another issue related to the superior orders defense is the doctrine of Act of
State, where the state answers for the individual since the act of the leader is
deemed the act of the sovereign.113 Presumably, the state adopts the position
of the superior in a highly ranked official's defense of superior orders. Article
7 of the Nuremberg Charter rejected the principle of international law, which
under certain circumstances, protects the representatives of a state. 114 The
Tribunal further held: "He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain
immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in
authorizing action moves outside its competence under international law."115
As the authors of acts condemned as criminal by international law, the
Nuremberg defendants could not hide behind their official positions in order
to be freed from punishment. Under the Charter, no defense based on either
the doctrine of superior orders or the doctrine that a person's crimes were acts
116
of state was permitted.

IV.THE YUGOSLAV DILEMMA
In 1946, the ten month Nuremberg trial was thought to have established an
international legal precedent, and maybe a deterrent. It has done neither. The
world continues to hold contempt for international law; the human rights of

necessity as an excuse for certain types of conduct, but not for the abandonment of the
rules of international law).
110GREEN,supra note 82, at 247.
111
112

d.
See KELMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 88, at 276.

113 See APPLEMAN, supra note 38, at 54; see also CONOT, supra note 12, at 514.
1141 IMT, supra note 11, at 223.
115

Id.
See 2 IMT, supra note 11, at 150 (discussing the principle of personal liability and
the intolerableness of permitting a state to become the basis of personal immunity).
116
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ordinary people continue to be flouted. The Nazis desired a "Greater Germany"
and the elimination of all undesirables. Today, the Serb ambition for a "Greater
117
Serbia" continues to drive them to dominate the region and its Slav peoples.
Bosnia-Herzegovina had been sidelined from the world stage since
Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian empire, was
assassinated in its capital, Sarajevo, in 1914, sparking off World War I. A
political conflict regarding disagreement over whether the six republics of the
former Yugoslavia should form a loose confederation or a strong federation
reinstated Bosnia in the media limelight. 118 That political conflict evolved into
an ethnic conflict that spilled over borders and ignited the Balkan War.119 The
division of the former Yugoslavia into separate nation-states has divided ethnic
groups rather than united them and has been "met in each of the other regions
with fierce resistance from highly mobilized minority populations whose
120
ethnic preferences" have led them to seek shelter with their "own" state.
The breakup of the former Yugoslav state has resulted in severe internal
ethnic violence. Bosnia-Herzegovina's central location and mixed ethnic and
religious profile have made it a natural battleground between forces on
opposite sides of the confederation-federation conflict. 12 1 It is of interest that
religious differences did not impede interethnic social contact in either Serbia

117

See Eric Bourne, The NurembergPrecedent,CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 9,1992,
at 18 (describing Serbs' Hitlerian "total war" against the non-Serbs of Bosnia).
118See Chuck Sudetic, A Yugoslav Republic Holds a Contested Election, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
19, 1990, at A7. The six republics of the former Yugoslavia, which have very different
degrees of economic development and a variety of peoples, religions, languages and
cultures, include the following: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro,
Macedonia, and Slovenia. Today, Yugoslavia is comprised of Serbia and Montenegro,
the only two republics in favor of a strong federation, but only with Serbian
predominance. Id. If the other regions proved unwilling to accept a federation as such,
Serbia was in favor of secession as well, but not without taking with it the parts of Croatia
and Bosnia containing substantial numbers of Serbs. Aleska Djilas, A PaperHouse: The
Ending of Yugoslavia, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 25,1993, at 38; see also infra note 120.
119See Wlodzimerz Sochacki, Yugoslavia: The Nationalists' Time Has Come, GAZETA
INT'L, Dec. 6, 1990, at 2 (describing the considerations of the republics on the
confederation-federation conflict). By the end of 1990, a series of local elections had
transformed the political landscape of the former Yugoslavia. See Sabrina Petra Ramet,
War in the Balkans, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept. 1992, at 79.
12 0The division is the direct result of the settlement of the nationality groups of the
former Yugoslavia across regional boundaries. See Steven Burg, Nationalism and
Democratization in Yugoslavia, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Oct. 1991, at 3. For example,

when the Muslims and Croats voted to separate Bosnia from Yugoslavia, Bosnian Croats
were not in favor of independence, only for secession from Yugoslavia. Like the Bosnian
Serbs, the Croats do not want to be a part of Bosnia; they want to unite with Croatia.
Djilas, supra note 118.
12 1

Sudetic, supra note 118. Bosnia's population is split between Europe's largest
Muslim community, which accounts for 40% of the population; the Eastern Orthodox
Serbs, 32%; the Roman Catholic Croats, 19%, and other people who claim theyare ethnic
Yugoslavs. Id.
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or Bosnia-Herzgovina until Serbia's politicians began to manipulate religious
sensitivity to ignite hatred for non-Serbs. 122 That hatred fueled the siege of the
Bosnian capital of Sarajevo by Serbian forces in March of 1992.123
"Ethnic cleansing," the forced removal of people from their homes because
of their religious or ethnic roots, characterizes the method employed by the
Serbs for killing and driving out all non-Serbs. 12 4 The war crimes and human
rights abuses perpetrated on defenseless Bosnian Muslims by Serbian forces
have been well- documented. Whole villages have been buried, but not before
they were looted. 125 Patients have been taken from their hospital beds, robbed
and shot. 126 Mosques dating back to the sixteenth century have been
destroyed,12 7 and systematic rape has been performed on thousands of
women. 128 The list of crimes is endless, and the number of persons murdered
and tortured countless.
Serbian military leadership does not understand the futility of applying
military solutions to political questions. After more than two years of perpetual
war, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic presumably would have concluded
as much.129 As politicians continue to search for a solution to the region's
122Ramet, supra note 119, at 81.
123
1d. The war proper began in Croatia in the summer of 1991, soon after Croatia's
secessior.. The conflict spread to Bosnia, however, after that republic's secession in
March, 1992. See The Future of the Balkans: An Interview With David Owen, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Mar. 1993, at 1; see also Djilas, supra note 118 (describing the Serbs' portrayal of
contemporary Croatia as a reincarnation of the fascist state of World War II that
massacred Serbian civilians, as well as thousands of Jews and gypsies).
124 Although all groups are blamed for their treatment of innocent civilians in the
Yugoslav Conflict, the greatest victims have been the Muslims, and the greatest
victimizers the ethnic Serbs in Bosnia. Thus, the Serbs have been singled out. See Djilas,
supra note 118; see also Gertrude Samuels, Putting War Crimes On The Un Agetua:
Nuremberg Reaffirmed, NEW LEADER, Mar. 8, 1993, at 7.
12 5

See Aryeh Neier, Watching Rights, THE NATION, Aug. 31, 1992, at 202 (describing
the order of General Ratko Mladic, the commander of Serbian forces in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, to "[b]urnitall");seealsoAdrian Lithgow & Paul Keel, Generalsof Genocide,
MAILON SUNDAY, Apr. 18,1993, at 1, 5 (reporting the discovery of a mass grave following
the disappearance of more than 3,000 persons from a town after its seizure by the Serbs).
12 6 Samuels, supra note 124.
12 7 Chuck Sudetic, U.N. Says 'Ethnic Cleansing' by Serbs Intensifies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
1994, at A13 (reporting the destruction of mosques "to teach minorities to respect Serb
law" and "to eras[e] all traces of a Muslim religious and cultural presence.. .
12 8 Samuels, supra note 124; see also Lithgow & Keel, supra note 125.
12 9

Leaders such as Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, Bosnia's Serbian leader, and
General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Serbian military forces in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, were on a list of people named as suspected Serb war criminals by United
States Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger in a speech delivered to an international
conference on the war in former Yugoslavia in December, 1992. See EagleburgerNames
Suspected War Criminals, Dec. 16, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Press
Association Newsfile.
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problems, the world has concluded that judicial intervention is necessary to
bring to account those who are responsible for the commission of war crimes
in the former Yugoslavia since 1991.130 With the establishment of the Yugoslav
Tribunal, the world has secured the means to prosecute the responsible
persons.
The United Nations Security Council had an adequate legal basis under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in conjunction with previous resolutions
concerning the territory of the former Yugoslavia, to establish an international
tribunal to prosecute war crimes committed in this territory.131 Given its broad
decision-making authority when acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
and the binding nature of its decisions, the Security Council's act of establishing
the Yugoslav Tribunal imparts continuing legal effect to the Nuremberg
principles. As Madeleine K. Albright, the United States Ambassador to the UN,
so aptly proclaimed:
There is an echo in this chamber today. The Nuremberg principles have
been reaffirmed ....
The lesson that we are all accountable to
international law may have finally taken hold in our collective memory
....
Serbian "ethnic cleansing" has been pursued through mass
murders, systematic beatings and the rapes of Muslims and others ....
Our conscience
revolts at the idea of passively accepting such
13 2
brutality.

Moreover, in May of 1993, the Security Council adopted the Statute of the
International Tribunal which serves as the legal basis for all prosecutions of
war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. 133

V. ADOPTION OF THE NUREMBERG PRINCIPLES BY THE YUGOSLAV TRIBUNAL
Since Nuremberg, the foundation of international law has been greatly
fortified. The rules of war have never been more clearly defined. For example,
13 0

0n February 22,1993, after repeated demands that parties to the Yugoslav conflict
cease from all breaches of international humanitarian law, the United Nations
15-member Security Council voted unanimously to establish the Yugoslav Tribunal to
prosecute the responsible persons. Sec-Gen. Rep., supra note 2, at 3.
131Chapter VII provides the Security Council with the authority to determine threats
to international peace and security and to takeappropriate steps to remedy the situation.
See UN CHARTER, chapter VII, arts. 39-41; supranote 1.Continuing reports of widespread
violations of international humanitarian law, including reports of mass killings and the
continuation of the practice of "ethnic cleansing" led the Security Council to conclude
that this situation constituted a threat to international peace and security. See Sec-Gen.
Rep., supra note 2, at 4. According to the Secretary-General, the Yugoslav Tribunal is
legally established as a subsidiary organ in conformance with Article 29 of the UN
Charter. Id. at 8.
13 2

Samuels, supra note 124.

133

The Statute was originally annexed to the Report of the Secretary-General pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 808. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 3175th mtg., at 2 (1993).
See supra note 1.
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the 1907 Hague Conventions and the 1929 Geneva Conventions highly
influenced decisionmaking for the Nuremberg Tribunal. 134 Successive UN
documents, notably the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1948 Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, embody some of the
lessons learned from World War II and further refine international law as it
relates to war crimes and crimes against humanity.135
To fully understand how the Nuremberg principles affect international law,
and more precisely adjudication for the Yugoslav Tribunal, it is necessary to
explore the components of international law. The Statute of the International
Court of Justice provides a summary of the sources of international law which
apply when adjudicating a conflict. 136 Article 38 (1) of the Statute enumerates
the following:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b)
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d)....
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
as subsidiary means for the
publicists of the various nations,
137
determination of rules of law.
The Nuremberg principles may qualify as accepted international law on all
counts. With regard to widespread acceptance in United Nations' instruments,
however, they are established under (a) and (c) above.
Without an international legislature, it is difficult for international law to
develop by legislation. It develops, instead, by adapting settled principles to
new situations. 138 The Nuremberg Tribunal declared that "by 1939 th[e] rules
laid down in the [Hague] Conventions were recognized by all civilized nations,
139
and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war.... "
Today, in addition to the Hague Conventions, there is universal acceptance of
conventions such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Convention,
and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment as treaties. 140 The adoption of the Nuremberg
134 See supra notes 19-20, 49-51, 65-68.
13 5

See Sec-Gen. Rep., supra note 2, at 9 (relating the undisputed embodiment of the
1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1948 Genocide Convention in international
customary law).
13 6See Statute of ICJ, supra note 24.
13 7

1d. art. 38.

13 8

See APPLEMAN, supra note 38, at 52 ("[V]iolations of international law have long

been punishable, even in the absence of legislative material fixing the punishments.").
13 9
TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 582-83.
140Supra note 32; see Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81
A.J.IL. 348 (describing the Geneva Conventions as binding on even more states than
the UN Charter).
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principles by the UN, moreover, contributes significantly to the expansive body
of law from which the newly established Yugoslav Tribunal may draw when
adjudicating the Yugoslav conflict.
Proposed first by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Statute of
the International Tribunal imparts legal effect to the Nuremberg principles.141
The Statute declares the Tribunal's subject-matter jurisdiction to be the
prosecution of "serious violations of international humanitarian law .... .,142
Articles 2 through 5 further define that jurisdiction to include prosecution of
grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Article 2), violations of the
laws or customs of war (Article 3), genocide (Article 4), and crimes against
humanity (Article 5).143 The Yugoslav Tribunal's jurisdiction, unlike that of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, does not extend to crimes against peace. The Charter's
provisions relating to war crimes and crimes against humanity,however, have
been adopted by the Security Council and incorporated into the Statute. 144
The comprehensive Report of the UN Secretary-General relating to "all
aspects of [the former Yugoslav] matter" 14 5 and the Statute of the Tribunal
annexed thereto have been approved and adopted by the UN Security Council,
respectively. 146 The Special Task Force (hereinafter Task Force) created by the
Section of International Law of the American Bar Association to analyze the
Statute and report on its implementation believes that the Statute still merits
significant modification. 147 As outlined below, the changes proposed by the
Task Force conflict with the Statute's consistent application of the Nuremberg

14 1
14 2

Statute, supra note 1.
See supra note 1.

143
Article 2 authorizes the Yugoslav Tribunal to prosecute violations that qualify as
war crimes or "grave breaches" under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Article 3
grants the power to prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of war. The
Secretary-General's Report demonstrates that such laws are comprised of the 1907
Hague Convention (TV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the
Regulations annexed thereto. Sec-Gen. Rep., supra note 2, at 11, §§ 41-44. Article 4
authorizes prosecution of acts of genocide, and article 5, crimes against humanity when
committed in armed conflict. See Statute, supra note 1, arts. 2-5. It is of interest that the
Nuremberg Tribunal refused to consider crimes against humanity committed before the
outbreak of war within their jurisdiction. 1 IMT, supra note 11, at 254. Article 5 of the
Statute, however, is silent regarding that issue.
14 4
See Statute, supra note 1, arts. 2-5. The definition of genocide under article 4 of the
Statute may be traced to Article 6 (c) of the Nuremberg Charter. NUREMBERG CHARTER,
supra note 17.
14 5See Sec-Gen. Rep., supra note 2, at 3.

146 Supra note 1.
14 7
The recommendations were not intended to suggest that debate over adoption of
the Statute be reopened. Instead, the Task Force acknowledged the adoption of the
Statute and proposed that its current status would facilitate the Security Council's
consideration of the recommendations. ABA REP., supra note 4, at 2.
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principles and therefore, should continue to be disregarded by the Security
Council. 148
A. The Principleof Nullum Crimen Sine Lege (No Crime Without Law)
The Nuremberg Tribunal confronted the Nazi defendants' ex post facto
challenges relating to crimes against peace. Although the Yugoslav conflict is
unrelated to such crimes, concern about potential defenses based on the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege, nevertheless, exists. 149 Anticipating an ex
post facto defense, the UN Secretary-General advocated the following view in
his Report: "[T]he international tribunal should apply rules of international
humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law so that
the problem of adherence of some but not all States to specific conventions does
not arise."150 According to the Report, the following conventions are
considered beyond doubt a part of international customary law: the 1907
Hague Conventions, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1948 Genocide
Convention, and the 1945 Nuremberg Charter.1 51 This limitation of the
Yugoslav Tribunal's jurisdiction to rules that have become accepted as
customary international law ensures adherence to the principle of nullum
crimen sine lege.
The Task Force concurred in the Secretary-General's determination to define
the Tribunal's subject-matter jurisdiction so as to ensure adherence to the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege.152 They felt it was necessary, however, to
modify Article 3 ("Violations of the laws or customs of war") and Article 5
153
("Crimes against humanity").
The Statute grants the Tribunal the power to prosecute persons violating the
laws or customs of war.154 Under Article 3:
Such violations shall include, but not be limited to:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not
justified by military necessity;
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings;
148Telephone Interview with Sushan Demirjian, Committee Programs Coordinator
for the ABA Section of Int'l Law and Practice (Jan. 12,1994).
149

See Sec-Gen. Rep., supra note 2, at 9.

150Id.
151/d.
152

ABA REP., supranote 4, at 12-13.

153

Id. at 13.

154

Statute, supra note 1, art. 3.
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(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences,
historic monuments and works of art and science;

(e) plunder of public or private property.

155

The crimes listed under Article 3 are not an exhaustive list, as indicated by its
language. The Task Force, however, believes it is necessary to reinforce the
Statute's adherence to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege by further
enumerating that list of crimes to include certain acts especially forbidden by
156
the Hague Regulations.

Almost fifty years ago, the Nuremberg Tribunal recognized that the 1907
Hague Regulations were recognized by all civilized nations and were regarded
as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war.157 Approximately fifty
years later, the Secretary-General has reaffirmed the Tribunal's finding by
explicitly stating in his Report that the Hague Convention IV and its
Regulations "ha[ve] beyond doubt become part of international customary
law."158 In the light of universal acceptance of the Hague IV and its annexed
Regulations, any additional enumeration of crimes under Article 3 would be
superfluous. 159 Thus, the Security Council's recommendation regarding
Article 3 has little, if any, merit.
With respect to Article 5, the Task Force believes that subparagraphs (g) and
(i) require further elaboration. 160 Under the Statute, Article 5 is set forth as
follows:

1551d.
15 6

ABA REP., supra note 4, at 13-14. The Task Force followed the language of Article
23 of the Hague Regulations, supra note 19, in its recommendation to modify Article 3
to conclude as follows:
(f) killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile
nation or army;
(g) killing or wounding an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or
having no longer means of defense, has surrendered at discretion;
(h) declaring that no quarter will be given;
(i) making improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag, or of the
military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive
badges of the Red Cross or Red Crescent;
(j) declaring abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court of law the
rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party.
ABA REP., supra at 13. In the light of the specific enumeration of each of the "grave
breaches" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions in Article 2, and the detailed enumeration of
acts which constitute genocide and conduct punishable thereunder in Article 4, the Task
Force believes that modification of Article 3 is necessary. Id.
157
Sec-Gen. Rep., supra note 2, at 11.
158

1d. at 9; supra note 151.

15 9

Sec-Gen. Rep., supra note 2, at 9.
0ABA REP., supra note 4, at 14-16. In addition to the Task Force's conviction that
modification of Article 5 (g) and (i) would reinforce adherence to the principle of nullum
crimen sine lege, it believes that such modifications would confirm that these crimes will
16

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1994

25

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:705

The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed
conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed
against any civilian population: (a) murder; (b) extermination; (c)
enslavement; (d) deportation; (e) imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape;
(h) persecutions161on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) other
inhumane acts.

The Task Force recommended an expansion of subparagraph (g) to include
specific reference to "enforced prostitution, enforced pregnancy, and other

widespread sexual offenses." 162 Article 5 provides the Yugoslav Tribunal with
great leeway in which to accommodate the sexual offenses that concern the
Task Force. Those crimes may fall under subparagraph (i) as "other inhuman
acts." In the light of the commission of systematic rape and other forms of
sexual assault on women in the former Yugoslavia, such a revision of

subparagraph (g), which incorporates other sexually related offenses, would
eliminate unwanted ex post facto claims and thereby reinforce adherence to
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.163 The expansive nature of
subparagraph (i), however, demonstrates that the recommendation to extend
the Statute's definition of rape is not essential and need not be considered
further by the Security Council.
The Task Force proposed to replace Article 5, subparagraph (i) with certain
provisions of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions not already covered
in subparagraphs (a) through (h).16 4 It claims that the phrase "other inhuman
acts" in subparagraph (i) remains "vulnerable to criticism as vague and
imprecise, since the Charter did not define that term."165 The Charter's failure
to define that term, however, does not make it necessary to do so now. Like the

be within theTribunal's subject-matter jurisdiction, even if it should determine that they
were committed in a non-international armed conflict. Id. at 15.
161Statute, supra note 1, art. 5.
162
ABA REP., supra note 4, at 15. The Task Force based its recommendation on the
Secretary-General's description of crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia as
"widespread and systematic rape and other forms of sexual assault, including enforced
prostitution." Id.; see also Sec-Gen. Rep., supranote 2, at 13.
163

ABA REP., supranote 4, at 15. It is of interest that although crimes against humanity
were first recognized in the Nuremberg Charter and judgment, Sec-Gen. Rep., supra note
2, at 13, the crime of rape was not specifically listed under Article 6(c). Instead, it
probably would have fallen under the provision "and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population." See NUREMBERG CHARTER, supranote 17, art. 6(c). Thus,
it may be extremely beneficial to establish a more inclusive definition of rape in the
Statute.
164

ABA REP., supra note 4, at 14-15; see 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 21, art.

3.
165

ABA REP., supra note 4, at 14. The Task Force traced the phrase "other inhuman
acts" back to article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, where crimes against humanity were
first recognized. See NUREMBERG CHARTER, supranote 17, art. 6 (c).
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argument above relating to universal acceptance of the Hague IV as a part of
international customary law, the same holds true for common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions and the Charter.1 66 Moreover, the phrase "other inhuman
acts" is a "catch-all" which allows the Tribunal enormous flexibility in its
adjudication. As such, there is no need to better define what is meant by "other
inhuman acts," for to do so would be a waste of time.
B. The Principleof Individual Responsibility
With regard to crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, the Security
Council adopted the Nuremberg principle that persons committing criminal
violations of international law are individually responsible for such
violations. 167 Thus, Article 7, subparagraph 1 of the Statute enumerates the
following: "A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a
crime . . . shall be individually responsible for the crime."168 The Security
Council also adopted the Nuremberg holding that following superior orders
was not an excuse for the perpetration of a crime.169 Under Article 7,
subparagraph 4 of the Statute, therefore, "[t]he fact that an accused person acted
pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not relieve him of
criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if
the International Tribunal determines that justice so requires."170 Thus, the
language of the Statute regarding superior orders is consistent with that of the
Nuremberg Charter.171
The Task Force concurred in the Statute's treatment of individual criminal
responsibility in Article 7, with two exceptions.172 First, as explained below, the
Task Force proposed a modification of the Statute's rejection of the defense of

166

Supra notes 151, 157-59.
1n his report, the Secretary-General stated "that all persons who participate in the
planning, preparation or execution of serious violations of international humanitarian
law in the former Yugoslavia contribute to the commission of the violation and are,
therefore, individually responsible." Sec-Gen. Rep., supra note 2, at 14;seealsoI IMT,supra
note 11, at 222-23.
167

168

Statute, supranote 1, art. 7, § 1.

169

1d. art. 7, § 4; see NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 17, art. 8.

17OStatute, supranote 1, art. 7, § 4. The Secretary-General promulgated the Nuremberg
conviction that superior orders do not relieve the perpetrator of the crime of his criminal
responsibilityand should notbea defense. Sec-Gen. Rep., supra note 2, at 15, § 57. Further,
the Secretary-General reaffirmed that obedience to superior orders may be considered
a mitigating factor, should the Tribunal determine that justice so requires. Id.
171

NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 17, art. 8.

172

See ABA REP., supranote 4, at 37-41.
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superior orders. 173 The second exception involved limiting mitigation of

punishment to those instances that involve duress. 174
The Task Force proposed that Article 7, subparagraph 4 be clarified to include
a limited exception recognizing the defense of superior orders in cases where
a defendant acting under military authority in armed conflict did not know the
orders to be unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and understanding would
not have known the orders to be unlawful.1 75 The Task Force based that
proposal on consideration of both the varying ranks of defendants and the
facial illegality of orders. 176 The Task Force's modification, however, creates a

dangerous loophole. 177

The proposed change regarding the defense of superior orders detours from
the path of consistency. Nuremberg rejected the defense of superior orders, and
there is no good reason to depart from that standard now.178 The standard of
reasonableness proposed by the Task Force would be better suited to the

Tribunal's adjudication of mitigation of punishment. Clearly, a competent
Tribunal would apply the correct standard of reasonableness in the more
appropriate sphere of adjudication-mitigation of punishment. 179
Second, the Task Force suggested that the Statute's treatment of superior
orders as grounds for mitigation of punishment should be restricted to apply

173Id.
174
1d. at 40-41.
175
Id. at 40. The Task Force recommends the following language for revising Article
7, subparagraph 4:
The fact that an accused person subject to military authority and discipline
in armed conflict acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior
shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility unless he did not know that
the order was unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and understanding
would not have known the order to be unlawful. The fact that an accused
person acted pursuant to an unlawful order may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the accused carried out the order under duress.
Id. at41.
176
1d. at 38-39; see also supra notes 100-04. The Task Force argues that such a limited
exception to the defense of superior orders would make the Statute more consistentwith
the Nuremberg proceedings subsequent to the Trial of the Major War Criminals. ABA
REP., supra at 38-39. Under Control Council Law No. 10, however, the defense of superior
orders was rejected, and no limited exception existed. See 11 CONTROL COUNCIL, art. 2,
§ 4(b).
177
1f even a limited exception to the defense of superior orders were acknowledged,
justice would not be served. See supra note 85; cf. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 630.

178Supra notes 81-83.
179
The "reasonable factor" ought to be a factor considered by the Tribunal in
mitigation of punishment. After all, a look at the Nuremberg precedent reveals that
"[tihe Charter implie[d] common senselimits to liability justas itplace[d] common sense
limits upon immunity." 2 IMT, supra note 11, at 151.
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only in cases of duress. 180 Thus, if the superior orders defense were rejected
because the defendant should have known that the order was illegal, the Task
Force claims that mitigation of punishment would only be justified if the order
was performed under duress. 181 Moreover, the Task Force believes that such a
modification would make the Statute even more consistent with standards
adopted in the Nuremberg proceedings subsequent to the Trial of the Major
War Criminals.1 82
Article 7, subparagraph 4, as it stands, however, remains consistent with the
Nuremberg Charter and Control Council Law No. 10.183 It is the
recommendation of the Task Force that departs from the Nuremberg standards.
Further, as the Statute rejects the defense of superior orders, mitigation of
punishment will cover a wide range of circumstances. 184 Thus, it would be
more beneficial to not limit the mitigation of punishment to only cases of
duress.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Yugoslav crisis has been marked not only by the blatant rejection of
international law by Serbia, but also by an unusual focus on international law
by the international community and the revival of a collective security system
based on the UN Charter. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the
Security Council created the Yugoslav Tribunal for the prosecution of violations
of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and adopted the
Statute for the Tribunal recommended by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations in his Report.
The Nuremberg precedent served as a guiding light for the
Secretary-General. His Report relied heavily upon Nuremberg with regard to
the establishment of the Yugoslav Tribunal and its Statute. In an effort to avoid
any claims of ex post facto application of law, the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the Yugoslav Tribunal, as defined by the Statute, explicitly reaffirms the
acceptance by the Nuremberg Tribunal of the Hague and Geneva Conventions
18

0ABA REP., supra note 4, at 40; see also supra note 175; cf.NUREMBERG
note 17, art. 8.
181
ABA REP., supra note 4, at 40.

CHARTER,

supra

182

1d. at 41. Once again, the Task Force proposes that such a modification of the Statute
would create greater consistency with the Nuremberg proceedings under Control
Council Law No. 10. See supra note 176. Law No. 10, however, contradicts that claim
because no exception existed which provided only for cases of duress. Instead, it
provided: "The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of his Government or
of a superior does not free him from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered
in mitigation." CONTROL COUNCIL, supra note 9, art. 2, § 4 (b).
183
The Statute's language with regard to the defense of superior orders and mitigation
of punishment mirrors that of the Charter and Control Council Law No. 10. See
NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 17, art. 8; see also CONTROL COUNCIL, supra note 9, art.
2, § 4 (b).
184Statute, supra note 1, art. 7, § 4.
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as customary international law. Moreover, the Statute's provisions relating to
the principle of individual responsibility and the defense of superior orders
mirror those of the Nuremberg Charter. Thus, the Statute represents a
consistent application of the Nuremberg principles.
The Task Force of the American Bar Association has tried without success to
modify the Statute. Although the Statute has already been adopted, the Task
Force has not given up hope that the Security Council will yet change specific
provisions in the Statute. Some of the proposed changes are superfluous and
therefore, their implementation would be a waste of the Security Council's
time. Other recommendations conflict with the Nuremberg path of
consistency; enacting such changes would involve an inconsistent application
of international principles of law. Thus, there is no need for the Security Council
to consider further any of the modifications set forth by the Task Force.
The portion of the Nuremberg Judgment that dealt with war crimes and
crimes against humanity committed by the defendants and criminal
organizations concerned, in large measure, the persecution and murder of the
Jewish people. 185 The Judgment also described evidence on war crimes and
crimes against humanity concerning murder and ill treatment of both prisoners
of war and civilian populations, pillage of public and private property, and
slave labor policy.186 In its analysis of the crimes, the Tribunal found it
appropriate to single out the persecution of the Jews as a manifestation of
consistent and systematic inhumanity on a huge scale. Today, the evidence
which the Yugoslav Tribunal must evaluate singles out the persecution of the
Muslims and relates to similar crimes performed on a different scale.
After Nuremberg, devoting maximum effort to the definition and
implementation of human rights remained high among our priorities. Thus, it
makes sense that the Yugoslav Tribunal has received international recognition.
Recognition, however, is not enough. While Nuremberg was thought to have
established a legal precedent and maybe a deterrent, it did neither. Events in
the former Yugoslavia attest to this. The fact that the UN had to take great pains
to establish another ad hoc tribunal further demonstrates the failure of the
international community to establish human rights as the foundation of
international law.187
The Nuremberg Trial was the first of its kind in history. It was designed to
punish the leaders of a regime and an army who were responsible for atrocious
crimes committed in the framework of their policy and its implementation. In
their adjudication, the judges appointed to the Tribunal undoubtedly followed
the law and their conscience. Once again, an International Tribunal has been

1851 IMT, supra note 11, at 228-53.
1 86

1d.

87

1 See Paul W. Kahn, Lessons for InternationalLaw from the Gulf War, 45 STAN. L. REV.
425, 440 (1993) ("For human rights to be the end, however, state sovereignty must be
displaced as the central value of the international legal system.").
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formed, this time to prosecute those responsible for great atrocities in the
former Yugoslavia.
The Statute's adoption of the Nuremberg precedent signifies a consistent
application of the principles of international law. Is this the best consistency,
however, that Nuremberg calls for? In his final report as Chief Prosecutor at
the Nuremberg trials, Brigadier General Telford Taylor wrote: "Unless the
United States and the other governments... seriously endeavor to establish a
permanent international penal jurisdiction, the inevitable conclusion will be
that Nuremberg was for Germans only."188 For a long time, there has been talk
of creating a permanent international criminal court, and yet nothing has come
of it.189 We agree all too often on principles, but practice and enforcement have
not kept pace with pronouncements. First came Nuremberg, and now, Bosnia.
It is time for the international community to take the appropriate steps toward
creating a permanent tribunal-the remedy for the best consistency.
LARA LEIBMAN 190

188 Samuels, supra note 124, at 9 (quoting TAYLOR, supra note 9).
189
See Alan Ferguson, Panel of Experts Wrong to Bosnia War Crimes, Lauyers Say,
TORONTO STAR, Oct. 9,1992, at A20; supra note 126; seealsoCommentary on Draft Statute

for an International Criminal Tribunal, in Report of the International Law Commission

(45th session)-3 May-23 July 1993, General Assembly (48th session), Supp. No. 10
(A/48/10) (explaining authority of permanence if linked to UN, by establishing
Tribunal as organ thereof) (on file with author).
190
The author wishes to thank Professor Henry T. King, Jr., for his help in preparing
this note.
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